With liberty and independence for all?
Liberty as Independence: The Making and Unmaking of a Political Ideal by Quentin Skinner (Cambridge University Press, 2025)
Reviewed by Elizabeth Stice
Quentin Skinner has a simple aim in Liberty as Independence, to demonstrate that the idea of liberty once meant independence. Under that definition, being free means “that you are not subject to the exercise of arbitrary power, and are consequently able to act according to your autonomous will and live as you choose” (1). But that definition was overtaken by another, one still with us today. By early in the nineteenth century, “liberty simply consists in not being restrained” (1). This book follows Skinner’s earlier works, Hobbes and Political Liberty (2008) and Liberty Before Liberalism (1998), and reflects the depth of his thought and research.
Liberty as Independence is not short on evidence. Skinner picks up the narrative with the Glorious Revolution of 1688, but he takes us back as far as the Greeks and Romans in the development of the idea of liberty as independence. Skinner’s familiarity with eighteenth-century English-speaking political figures, on both sides of the Atlantic, is nearly encyclopedic. He walks readers through generations and varieties of Whigs, parliamentary debates, pamphlets, and larger texts. He also integrates literature, using works like Tom Jones to great effect. Again and again, sources confirm that liberty meant independence to most English-speaking thinkers in the eighteenth century, understood so strongly that “the mere fact of living in subjection to someone else’s will is sufficient to reduce you to servitude” (63).
The view of liberty as independence was challenged by the debates surrounding the American Revolution and was overturned during the French Revolution. Skinner effectively shows “that the new view of liberty was widely espoused as a means of fending off the republican and democratic potential of the established view that liberty consists in independence” (175). Liberty as absence of restraint leaned on religious arguments in favor of submission to authorities, but it was chiefly built by early nineteenth century liberals. What they left behind was the necessity of democracy—“Paine’s notion that civil liberty can only be achieved when the people control the government”—and the idea that our rights and liberty come from God (261).The theorists of the new idea of liberty emphasized happiness, which they asserted could only be secured with subjection to a sovereign power, away from the state of nature (263-264). Under the definition of liberty as freedom from restraint, it matters less whether or not people create their own laws. The test of a law is whether its effect “will contribute to the ultimate goal of promoting happiness” (269).
The differences between the definitions are meaningful. If “individual liberty is best understood as absence of subjection,” then “liberty is conceptually connected with equality” (276). Those “who defend the claim that liberty consists in absence of restraint think of it simply as a predicate of choices and actions” (3-4). The new view is on display in many places. One example is in Turkmenistan, Where on Earth is That? by Tam Macklin, who spent a year working in Turkmenistan, observes that despite repression, “Turkmenistan provides a relatively safe and stable environment for its non-disruptive inhabitants” (248). Most people do not get into trouble with the government and for them, life seems pretty good. Life is far from perfect and it is hard for disruptive inhabitants, but “secrecy, mistrust, some repression and an element of fear seem to make Turkmenistan a benign, safe, stable and reasonably happy place to be a law-abiding citizen” (249). Under the definition of freedom as absence of restraint, one can be free in Turkmenistan. Under the definition of freedom as liberty, one cannot.
Skinner clearly hopes to rehabilitate the idea of liberty as independence. That definition reinforces the importance of democracy, equality, and rights. It may also help us better understand the geopolitical context around us. On the final page, he reminds us that “there are many states that currently live to some extent in dependence on the arbitrarily wielded power of richer states. A state or corporation that chooses to invest in an economically disadvantaged country will always be in a position to extract special privileges” (280). If we do not understand liberty as independence, we may be unable to “recognize how discretionary and hence purely dispositional power can undermine autonomous choice” (280).
It would not be a stretch to suggest that differences about the idea of liberty flavor our debates about current events. Some state actions and political decisions will be viewed as an infringement of liberty if liberty is related to autonomy, but can easily be excused by those who consider liberty merely the absence of coercion. Different definitions of liberty offer different interpretations of relationships between individuals and workplaces or communities and corporations. Debates about data centers and sports stadiums and student debt can be about liberty and the loss of it from one angle, or they can be much less concerning.
Skinner’s examination of liberty echoes the concerns in Hannah Arendt’s essay “What is Freedom?” first published in 1960. Arendt emphasizes the Greco-Roman notion of freedom, which involved action and liberation from the necessities of life that allowed political participation. For Arendt, that notion—and the importance of public life—was challenged by the Stoics and the idea of “inner freedom,” but it was effectively corrupted by Christianity, which suggested a divided self and emphasized the will. As a result, many people have forgotten the importance of public life and the significance of action. Some even believe that being free means being able to avoid politics, rather than being able to help set the course of public life. Too many of us have abdicated the realm of action.
Many of us know very little about eighteenth-century English intellectual history, but, as should be clear, you can make a dozen different arguments about the timeliness of Liberty as Independence. In addition to current events and debates, this year is also “America 250,” as we are calling the semiquincentennial. It could be a good time to revisit, or reclaim, that earlier idea of liberty as independence. The rise of artificial intelligence also suggests that liberty as independence may be especially significant. To what extent does AI use render us less autonomous and less free, whether or not we are coerced by it? For all of those conversations and more, it seems a richer understanding of the meaning of liberty can only be helpful. Liberty as Independence is a very good place to start and an excellent example of intellectual history.
Elizabeth Stice is a professor of history and assistant director of the honors program at Palm Beach Atlantic University. She is the author of Empire Between the Lines: Imperial Culture in British and French Trench Newspapers of the Great War (2023) and she is a contributing editor and associate books editor at Front Porch Republic.
